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NONDEGRADATION AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1977: PREVENTING THE
GRAYING OF AMERICA
JACQUELYN BRANAGAN*
Beginning with the Air Quality Act of 1967,1 Congress has reiterated
a policy "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air re-
sources."-2 The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 escalated the war
against air pollution, authorizing the newly created Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set nationwide primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards.4 Ambient air standards, in contrast to
emission controls, limit the amount of pollution which can accumulate
in the outside air rather than directly limit the amount of pollution
discharge from a particular source. The 1970 Amendments adopted
primary standards to protect the public health. Secondary standards
were designed to protect against "any known or anticipated adverse
effects" of the particular pollutant.5 However, the assumption that any
level of pollution below a certain threshold will produce no adverse
health effects is probably false. 6 In addition, the national ambient air
* B.A., University of Iowa, 1971; J.D. expected, Washington University, 1978.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1967).
2. Id. § 101(b)(1) (1967).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1970).
4. Id. § 1857c-4(a)(1) (1970). Standards have been promulgated for sulfur oxides,
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons and nitro-
gen dioxide. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-.11 (1976). EPA has been directed to formulate standards
for lead. NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970). States were to devise plans to implement and
maintain these standards. Id. § 1857c-5 (1970).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-91 (1976); Nondegradation Policy of
the Clean Air Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
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standards also fail to take into account synergistic effects or chronic
effects due to long term low level exposure.7 These problems are real,
but as yet there is no proof of causal connections nor any way to
quantify the effects to establish a basis for stricter national ambient air
standards.8 One way to address the problems associated with national
ambient air standards, given present knowledge and technology, is to
prevent the deterioration of air which is already cleaner than that
required by the national standards. The Clean Air Act Amendments of
19779 adopted a statutory scheme to prevent significant deterioration
through lower ambient standards in clean air areas together with emis-
sion limitations based on the best available control technology. It is the
purpose of this Note to examine the concept of non-significant deterio-
ration and the recent legislative plan to implement the concept.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The concept of nondegradation of clean air involves several differ-
ent policy considerations. Perhaps the most basic is the question
whether dilution is really the best method to control pollution in clean
air areas.10 Dilution is accomplished through uniform ambient stan-
dards which allow varying emissions depending upon the existing level
of ambient air quality. In urban areas, for example, emissions must
generally be low to meet the ambient standards, but in clean air areas,
ambient standards leave a wide margin for additional emissions. As a
result, some advocate adopting uniform emissions limitations to avoid
the inequitable results of nationwide ambient standards."' Opponents
view the application of uniform emission limitations in clean air areas
as too costly for the results achieved. They suggest that the law of
diminishing returns applies.
The latter argument involves a method of decision-making which
compares the costs and benefits to the society as a whole. The costs
are not only monetary but include social costs such as unemployment
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Nondegradation Policy] (scientists say threshold levels are merely a convenience reflect-
ing the limits of scientific knowledge at a particular time).
7. H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-101 (1976).
8. Id. at 96.
9. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)).
10. Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The
Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REv. 643, 643-44 (1977)




CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1977
and benefits foregone. This approach assumes that "[t]he ultimate
objective of the allocative process is to devote all of society's scarce
resources (capital goods, labor, technological skill, as well as natural
resources) to the combination of uses that produces the largest meas-
ure of satisfaction for all people in the society."1' 2 Clean air can be
viewed as a scarce resource. Social and economic factors can be
important considerations in determining, as a policy matter, how much
pollution should be allowed. 13 The purpose of cost-benefit analysis is
to ensure a rational decision which takes into account the effects on all
societal groups.
The assumption that social or economic costs might outweigh the
need for maintenance of pristine air quality is itself challenged by
environmentalists. They dispute first that economic efficiency is even
relevant to the environmental decision. Second, environmentalists ar-
gue that environmental costs are not calculable in economic terms. 4
This attitude is related to the conservation ethic which views clean air
as an irretrievable natural resource. 5
A. Authority For a Nondegradation Policy
The concept of nondegradation was first applied as a national policy
against "significant deterioration in air quality" in 196916 by the agency
responsible for administration of the 1967 Air Quality Act. 17 The au-
thority to implement the policy came not from any specific legislative
mandate, but from the language of the statutory purpose "to protect
12. Id. at 650. This is a policy decision which affects the entire population and which
is ordinarily made in the market. Since there is no market for clean air, the decision
would be best made by represenatives of the entire populace-the Congress. See also
Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 68, 74 ("This is truly a political issue of such
importance that it must be resolved in the political crucible. Only then can it be examined
within the entire range of our national interests.").
13. Kramer, Economics, Technology, and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970: The
First Six Years, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161, 164 (1976) (Congress can make basic legislative
policy choices balancing health and environment against economic, technological and
social considerations) [hereinafter cited as Kramer].
14. Hines, supra note 10, at 651-52.
15. Id. at 646-49 ("The simple idea on which the policy is based is the recognition that
somewhere in the frenzied pursuit of more material possessions and a higher living
standard it is morally necessary to think about what kind of world will be passed along to
future generations.").
16. Guidelines for the Development of Air Quality Standards and Implementation
Plans, Part I, § 1.51 at 7 (1969).
17. The National Air Pollution Control Administration of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare.
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and enhance."' 8 This language was retained in the 1970 Clean Air
Amendments 9 but without any clear statutory statement of nondegra-
dation policy. 20
Thus, when EPA took over administration of air pollution control, it
faced the problem of how to deal with the question of nondegradation.
Its first position was that national standards would not "allow signifi-
cant deterioration of existing air quality."21 A few months later, how-
ever, EPA seemed to contradict itself in regulations providing that
". .. where measured or estimated ambient levels of pollutant[s] are
below the levels specified by an applicable secondary standard, the
[state implementation] plan shall set forth a control strategy which
shall be adequate to prevent such ambient pollution levels from ex-
ceeding such secondary standard. ' 22 The two statements appeared
inconsistent but EPA maintained that the first statement was only
meant to inform the states that standards could be stricter than the
national standards.23 This position was untenable. The proposition that
state standards could be more stringent is explicitly stated not only in
the amendments and the legislative history,24 but also in the EPA
18. "Air quality standards which, even if fully implemented, would result in signifi-
cant deterioration in air quality ... would conflict with the expressed purpose of the
law." Guidelines for the Development of Air Quality Standards and Implementation
Plans, Part I, § 1.51 at 7 (1969) (emphasis added). The agency reiterated its policy at the
1970 hearings on the Clean Air Amendments. Air Pollution-1970: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1970) (testimony of HEW Undersecretary John Veneman on
behalf of Secretary Robert H. Finch).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970).
20. Some Senators who voted for the Clean Air Act of 1970 did not contemplate a
national policy of nondeterioration. "[ihe fact that there was so much uncertainty is
clear evidence that Congress was not, in fact, adopting a policy of nondeterioration."
123 CONG. REC. S9245 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Garn). The Senate
Report, however, said:
In areas where current air pollution levels are already equal to, or better than, the
air quality goals, the Secretary should not approve any implementation plan which
does not provide, to the maximum extent practicable, for the continued mainte-
nance of such ambient air quality.
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970).
21. 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(c) (1976). The regulation was promulgated on April 30, 1971. 36
Fed. Reg. 8187 (1971).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
23. Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) reprinted in
Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 281-82 ("Reading the latter two sections
together, it is clear that they simply state that there is no federal preemption of a State's
right to establish stricter standards than the federal ones.
24. The statute says:
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political
[Vol. 14:203
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regulation immediately following the one in question here. 25 Adminis-
trator Ruckelshaus gave a more believable reason. He said the Clean
Air Amendments gave EPA no authority to prevent deterioration and
that such a policy would be administratively unworkable. 26
1. A Court Mandate
The Sierra Club refused to accept either rationale for the dichotomy
in the regulations. Furthermore, the Sierra Club believed that the
second regulation would allow significant deterioration of air quality
and that it was the EPA Administrator's duty to prevent such deterio-
ration. As a consequence of these contentions, Sierra Club filed suit
under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Amendments. 27 In
subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting
emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement
of air pollution ....
42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970). The legislative history reiterates this in numerous places.
COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF
1970, Ser. 93-18, 194, 410, 807 ("no one is preventing any State from having stronger
standards"), 815 ("The States will be left free to establish stricter standards. ... ),
843-44, 891, 972 (State option to design implementation plan to achieve or preserve
higher standards), 990-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
25. 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(d) (1976). See Brief for Respondent at 45-46, Fri v. Sierra Club,
412 U.S. 541 (1973) reprinted in Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 353-54.
26. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 246-47, 271-74, 313-14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Implementation of the
Clean Air Act]. The Administrator argued that § 110 of the Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-5 (1970), required him to approve any implementation plan which would achieve
the national standards and that § 110 therefore did not allow him to disapprove plans
which did not include nondeterioration. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970) provides:
[Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf. . . (2) against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the administrator to perform any
Act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
One commentator argued that § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970), is the section describing
the EPA's duty to prevent nondegradation: the new source performance standards. The
section requires the Administrator to publish a list of categories of stationary sources
which may contribute significantly to air pollution, and then publish standards of per-
formance for new sources within each category. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1) (1970). The
standards are emission limitations reflecting the best technology adequately demon-
strated. Id. § 1857(a)(1) (1970). The commentator argued that the Administrator was
correct in saying that § 110 relates only to national ambient air standards but "almost all
activities which could give rise to the degradation of existing air quality would come
within the scope of [§ 111]." Little, The Aftermath of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970:
The Federal Courts and Air Pollution, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 724, 748 (1973).
Since the Administrator had already promulgated new source performance standards, 36
Fed. Reg. 24,877 (1971), Sierra Club could not sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-2(a) (1970).
They could, however, contest the Administrator's judgement in a suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1977]
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Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus 28 an injunction was issued which prohibited
the Administrator from approving any state plan which would allow
significant deterioration of existing clean air.29 The district court did
not, however, specify the means to achieve nondeterioration or what
would constitute "significant" deterioration.
The Administrator's response was slow although he did quickly
promulgate a regulation disapproving all state plans to the extent that
they allowed significant deterioration of air quality. 30 After two years
and much debate, EPA finally proposed a new plan.31 The plan was
1857h-5(b)(1) (1970) (review of Administrator's action in promulgating new source
performance standards may be had in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia). Little, supra at 746-50.
28. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 4
E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri
v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). The Sierra Club argued that the language "protect
and enhance" evidenced a statutory policy against deterioration of air quality. Corhan,
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 5 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 237, 255 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, 5
(1970) reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5256, 5357, 5360 ("Effective
pollution control requires both reduction of present pollution and prevention of new
significant pollution problems."). Finally, Sierra Club pointed to the inconsistency
between the EPA regulations. Brief for Respondent at 32-33, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S.
541 (1973) reprinted in Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 340-41.
The Administrator replied that § 110 of the Clean Air Amendments directs that, on
certain conditions, "The Administrator shall approve such plan ... " (emphasis add-
ed). The conditions do not mention nondeterioration as a basis for disapproval. See 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970); Brief for Petitioner at 11-14, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S.
541 (1973) reprinted in Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 273-76.
29. The district court's opinion paralleled Sierra Club's argument (outlined in note 28,
supra) and added that "the public interest in this case strongly supports the legislative
policy of clean air and the non-degradation of areas in which clean air exists." 344 F.
Supp. at 257. The injunction granted was preliminary, but the parties stipulated on
appeal that it would be considered final. Corhan, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 5 COLuM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 237, 240 (1973);
Disselhorst, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus: "On A ClearDay. . .", 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 739,
741-42 (1975). For an argument that the district court decision was correct but the
rationale was wrong, see Hines, supra note 10, at 666-68.
30. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1976). It was a year before the Administrator proposed four
specific plans for nondeterioration. The plans would have established 1972 as a baseline
year and would have regulated only for sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. States
would have been required to review any new or modified source of air pollution to assure
compliance with nonsignificant deterioration, but would have had great leeway in im-
plementation strategy. New or modified sources would have had to apply the "Best
Available Control Technology" to control pollution. All the plans would have allowed
deterioration to secondary ambient air standards in portions of clean air areas. For a
more detailed discussion of the four plans, see Farrell, The Nondegradation Controver-
sy: How Clean Will Our "Clean Air" Be?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 314.
31. Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, Proposed Rule-making, 39
Fed. Reg. 31,000 (1974).
[Vol. 14:203
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designed to regulate only sulfur dioxide and particulate matter, rather
than all six pollutants for which national ambient air standards had
been promulgated. 32 The plan divided clean air areas into smaller
regions which could be designated Class I, Class II, or Class III. 33 The
classes allowed varying increments in air pollution above a baseline air
quality with the baseline year set at 1973. 31 Class I increments were
very small, Class II allowed for some controlled growth and Class III
allowed deterioration up to the secondary standards. 35 Initially all clean
air areas were Class 11.36 The states could reclassify areas as I or III
after public hearings which included a required "consideration of...
the social, environmental and economic effects of such redesigna-
tion." 37 The Administrator was required to approve the redesignation
so long as it was not arbitrary or capricious. 38
32. Id. at 31,007. The other four pollutants were "automative pollutants," so called
because the major source of each is the automobile. EPA explained that they were
omitted because the relationship between emissions of these pollutants and the resulting
ambient air levels is little understood. The only model for relating these emissions to air
quality is "useful only in areas where ambient pollutant levels are substantial and well
monitored." Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
33. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,007 (1974).
34. Id.
35. Id. The specific increments for Class I and Class II were:
Particulate matter: Class I Class II
Annual Geometric Mean 5 10
24-hr. maximum 10 30
Sulfur dioxide:
Annual Arithmetic Mean 2 15
24-hr. maximum 5 100
3-hr. maximum 25 700
Class III was limited to no greater than the national ambient air quality standards. Id.
36. Id. Other required considerations were growth anticipated in the area and any
impacts on regional or national interests.
37. Id. The minimum procedural requirements were: at least one public hearing after
30 days notice by prominent advertising of the date, time and place, availability of the
proposal to the public and notification of the Administrator and any affected State or
local government. The Administrator was to receive a record of each hearing upon
request. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 51.4 (1976).
38. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,008 (1974). The regulation says:
Any redesignation. . . shall be approved unless the Administrator determines (1)
that the requirements of [procedure] have not been complied with, (2) that the State
has arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded relevant environmental, social or
economic consideration in any redesignation, or (3) that the State has not requested
delegation of responsibilities for carrying out this section.
The arbitrary and capricious standard was developed in administrative law for judicial
review of agency actions. The fundamental concept is that agencies develop expertise in
their respective fields and therefore their judgments should carry great weight. Yet
1977]
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To prevent increased pollution in clean air areas, the plan required
the EPA Administrator to review any new or modified source of air
pollution which appeared on a list of nineteen major types of stationary
source polluters.3 9 The source could not commence construction or
expansion until the Administrator, after public comment, 40 determined
that the applicable increments would not be violated and that the new
source would apply the best available control technology (BACT) for
minimizing emission of sulfur dioxide and particulates .41 Thus, the plan
used a combined approach: limitations on both emissions and accumu-
lation in the ambient air. With minor changes,4 2 these regulations
agency discretion with no check would be abhorrent in our form of government. At the
beginning of the 1970's three standards had been developed to balance these considera-
tions in judicial review: the broadest judicial inquiry under the clearly erroneous test, the
narrowest under the arbitrary or capricious test, and something between the two under
the substantial evidence test. The Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), blurred the distinction between the latter two tests.
Professor Davis says that now the "law is not only unclear but quite confused." K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, 652 (1976). What is clear is that the
decision-making must follow the procedure required by law and consider all relevant
evidentiary factors for the decision to survive the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, 658-63 (1976).
39. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,008 (1974). A new source was one which had not commenced
construction six months prior to the effective date of the regulations. The 19 categories
were: fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants of more than 1,000 million B.T.U. per hour
heat input, coal cleaning plants (thermal dryers), Kraft pulp mill recovery furnaces,
Portland cement plants, primary zinc smelters, iron and steel mill metallurgical furnaces,
primary aluminum ore reduction plants, primary copper smelters, municipal incinerators
capable of charging more than 250 tons of refuse per day, sulfuric acid plants, petroleum
refineries, lime plants, phosphate rock processing plants, by-product coke oven bat-
teries, sulfur recovery plants, carbon black plants (furnace process), primary lead
smelters, fuel conversion plants, and sintering plants.
40. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,008, 31,009 (1974). The minimum procedural requirement was
prominent advertising and availability of information submitted by the applicant together
with the Administrator's analysis, and a 30 day period for submitting public comment.
All comments were to be available for public inspection and the Administrator was
required to consider them in making his final determination. Copies of the application
and analysis were to go to every affected state, local or Indian government, every
affected federal land manager, and any affected comprehensive regional land use plan-
ning agency. Id.
41. Id. at 31,008. Best available control technology meant technology capable of
meeting the federal new source performance standards set out in 40 C.F.R. § 60 (1976). If
there was no standard promulgated, best available control technology would be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the process, fuels, and raw materials
available; the engineering aspects of various control techniques adequately demon-
strated; the costs of control technology; any applicable state and local emission limita-
tions; and siting considerations.
42. Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974).
The baseline year was changed to 1975. Id. at 42,514-15.
[Vol. 14:203
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became final on December 5, 1974, and were promulgated as amend-
ments to disapproved state implementation plans.43
Again dissatisfied, the Sierra Club filed suit in the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals to challenge the final regulations. In Sierra Club
v. EPA,' the Sierra Club argued that the plan promulgated by EPA
was inadequate for six major reasons: 1) the plan encompassed only
two of the six pollutants for which national standards had previously
been established, 2) the plan permitted significant deterioration in
Classes II and III, 3) the plan allowed for consideration of economic
and social factors in determining permissible deterioration, 4) under
the plan review of new sources was based on New Source Perform-
ance Standards rather than BACT in a case-by-case analysis, 5) under
the plan review was limited only to "significant" sources, and 6) under
the plan, allowable increments were unrelated to anticipated adverse
effects on public health and welfare. 45 Although the intervening states
agreed with many of Sierra Club's objections, they also argued that the
regulations would interfere with their authority under the Clean Air
Act.46 Further objections to the regulations were raised by industrial
43. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.01(d), (f) and 52.21 (1976). This was what the Administrator was
required to do under the injunction granted in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
253 (D.D.C. 1972). The order said in part:
The Administrator shall prepare and publish proposed regulations, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1857c-5(c) as to any state plan which he finds, on the basis of his review,
either permits the significant deterioration of existing air quality in any portion of
any state or fails to take the measures necessary to prevent such significant
deterioration. Such regulations shall be promulgated within six months of this
order.
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972) (unpublished order of May
30, 1972) reprinted in Implementation of the Clean Air Act-975: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 945 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Implementation 1975].
44. 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Numerous states and industrial petitioners joined
in the litigation. The states included Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Dakota and Wyoming. Id. at 1120. There was
some controversy as to which was the "appropriate circuit" under § 307, 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5 (1970). Industrial petitioners filed in several circuits: the Alabama Power Com-
pany in the Fifth Circuit, the American Petroleum Institute and other power companies
in the Sixth Circuit, the Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp. in the Seventh Circuit, Ken-
necott Copper Corp. in the Ninth Circuit, and Utah International, Inc. in the Tenth
Circuit. The petitions were finally consolidated in the D.C. Circuit to avoid inconsistent
results and delay in implementation. 6 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 358 (1975). The Sixth
Circuit opinion transferring its petitions for review said that the D.C. court "clearly. ..
is in the best position to determine whether the regulations are consistent with its order in
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972)." Id.
45. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976). All the contentions were the
result of Sierra Club's view that the regulations were too weak.
46. The argument was based on the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(a)(3),
1857c-2(a) (1970). The first section says "that the prevention and control of air pollution
1977)
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petitioners. They argued that the holding of Sierra Club v. Ruckel-
shaus47 should be reversed and that the regulations were unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause, the fifth amendment and the tenth
amendment. 48 The court was not persuaded by the objections to the
regulations. Consequently, the court upheld Sierra Club v. Ruckel-
shaus,49  and found the regulations both constitutional and
reasonable. 50
at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments." 42 U.S.C. §
1857(a)(3) (1970). The second section says:
Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the
entire geographic area comprising such State by submitting an implementation plan
for such State which will specify the manner in which national primary and second-
ary ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained ....
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (1970). The states claimed that the authority of federal land
managers and Indian governments to propose redesignation of their lands violated the
delegation of authority to the states and gave too much power over neighboring areas.
Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
47. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
48. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
49. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). The court said that the district court decision
affirmed by a panel of the D.C. Court of Appeals could not be reconsidered by a
different panel without a clear showing that the prior case was incorrectly decided. The
court's belief that Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus was correctly decided was "bolstered by
its acceptance in other courts." Id. at 254. For some cases that have followed the lower
court's decision, see Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1124-30 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Big
Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976); NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
50. The court used the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Sierra Club v.
EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Constitutionally, the court found adequate
power in Congress under the commerce clause, a proper legislative purpose plus a
rational relationship between means and ends, no "taking" and no infringement on the
reserve powers of the states. Id. at 1139-40.
The Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari in Sierra Club v. EPA, 430 U.S. 959
(1977), but granted the writ in Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 430 U.S. 953 (1977); Am.
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 430 U.S. 953 (1977); Ind.-Ky. Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 430 U.S. 953
(1977); Utah Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 430 U.S. 953 (1977); and W. Energy Supply v.
EPA, 430 U.S. 953 (1977). The writs were granted to consider the questions: 1) whether
regulations promulgated by EPA were authorized by the Clean Air Act, and 2) whether
the Clean Air Act permits EPA to adopt regulations which grant power to federal land
managers and Indian governing bodies to reclassify lands within their jurisdiction. 430
U.S. 953 (1977). On October 3, 1977, the Court denied a motion of the Solicitor General
to dismiss the writs of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court instead vacated
judgment and remanded the cases to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
for further consideration in light of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (Oct. 4, 1977).
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: A COMBINED APPROACH
While Sierra Club v. EPA51 was being decided, Congress was con-
sidering amending the Clean Air Act to include a nondegradation
provision. 52 The proposed amendment addressed some of the concerns
of Sierra Club and the intervening states, while steadfastly rejecting
the industrial viewpoint.
The controversial nondegradation amendment was filibustered in the
last days of the ninety-fourth Congress, 53 but after more debate and
revision finally became law in August, 1977. 51 The basic plan of the
final amendment is similar to the EPA regulations, including both
lower ambient limits and emissions control. Nonetheless there are
striking differences between the two plans.
Thus, to fully understand the 1977 amendments, the legislation will
be analyzed in light of the objections to the EPA regulations made by
petitioners in Sierra Club v. EPA.
A. Technology Forcing
In 1970, with the passage of the Clean Air Act, 55 Congress made a
policy decision that public health is more important than the costs to
clean up the air.-s Congress adopted ambient air standards as the
primary vehicle to curb pollution because the standards tend to be
technology forcing, at least to the extent that technology is not already
available to meet them. 57 However, ambient standards alone would
51. 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 717, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
53. A filibuster by Senators Jake Gan (R-Utah) and Frank Moss (D-Utah) blocked
passage of the conference bill on the day before adjournment. 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 835
(1976).
54. 123 CONG. REc. H8672, S13711 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1970).
56. See Kramer, supra note 13, at 169 ("the statement of congressional purpose
obviously assigns a top level priority to protecting health, at high cost if necessary
57. See La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Stat-
utes, 62 IowA L. REV. 771, 772-74 (1977) [hereinafter cited as La Pierre]; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Kramer, supra note 13 at 172-73; Note,
Considerations of Technological and Economic Factors in Air Pollution Control, 44 U.
CINN. L. REV. 573, 588, 597 (1975) (deletion of language leads to the conclusion those
factors were not to be considered). Technology-forcing was also an explicit policy of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. See also S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-
18 (1977) ("Throughout this bill there is a philosophy of encouragement of technology
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force technology only if, nationwide, the air were uniformly dirtier
than the standards allow. In most of the country where the air is
cleaner than required ambient air standards are ineffective at prompt-
ing technological improvement.
In this situation, ambient standards provide incentive for industry to
move from dirty areas to clean areas and for new industry to settle in
clean areas.58 As a result, industry in dirty areas must pay the cost of
emission controls, while industry in clean areas can pollute with im-
punity up to the level of the ambient standards. This creates a serious
inequity because industry that isn't paying for the social harm it causes
gains an unfair competitive advantage. All other factors considered
equal, a company which uses a common resource without any cost to
it, can keep its prices relatively lower than competitors forced to pay
for the cost of their pollution. 59
The problem of inequity can be solved by establishing emission
limitations rather than ambient standards. Everyone then must use the
same or similar control techniques and all stand on an equal competi-
tive footing with regard to pollution control. Nonetheless, there are
two problems with this approach. First, emission limitations are based
on current technology and thus, fail to provide incentives to industry to
spend time and money developing more efficient controls.' Second,
assuming new technology is somehow developed, emission limitations
promulgated either legislatively or administratively will lag far behind
technology improvements because of the inevitably long process in-
development."); 123 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 8, 1977) ("One of the corner-
stones of a policy to keep clean air areas clean is to require that new sources use the best
technology available to clean up pollution. It is important to assure that new, improved
technology is applied as it is developed. And it is important to provide incentives to
improve pollution control systems.").
58. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 874 ("[W]eak standards would give a
disproportionate incentive for new industries and new energy development. . . to move
into clean air regions.").
59. "Those sources which have chosen to delay, avoid or litigate have, in fact,
achieved economic advantage. Thus, the competitive health, as well as the public health,
has been placed in danger." 123 CONG. REC. S9172 (daily ed. June 8, 1977). The
uncontrolled polluter's advantage over competitors isn't the only inequity. Such a
system "places the cost of pollution on those who receive the damage: the asthmatic
who has more attacks, the child who has bronchitis . . . and the farmer whose crops
yield less. These people are now bearing the costs of air pollution." Id. at S9171.
60. La Pierre, supra note 57, at 774. See also 123 CONG. REC. H8669 (daily ed. Aug.
4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) (auto industry's capacity for generating arguments
against even weak standards is seemingly endless); Implementation 1975, supra note 43,
at 859 ("Industry given the choice between controlling to a very high level or something
less will always choose the latter.").
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volved in changing established standards. At worst, there might be no
attempt at all to change them. 61
In this context it is easy to see the simple logic of Sierra Club's
argument that review of new sources planning to locate in clean air
areas must be on the basis of the best available control technology
determined case-by-case, 62 rather than on the basis of section 111 New
Source Performance Standards. A case-by-case application of the best
available control technology solves the second problem of failure to
alter established emission limitations but still does not provide incen-
tive for the development of new technology. It only makes technology
obligatory if and when developed. In the 1977 Amendments, Congress
attempted to solve the problem of a need for incentive for development
of new technology.
The Amendments first significantly decreased the ambient level of
pollution allowed in clean air areas by establishing a permissible per-
centage increase over the baseline level in the particular area. The
increment is small for Class I areas, greater for Class II, and greatest
for Class III. The baseline level plus the increase allowed determine
the total ambient pollution allowed in the area, and supercede the
higher nationwide ambient standard.63 Congress did not stop with
lower ambient standards, however. In addition, it added emission
limitations for all new major polluters. The emission limitation for each
polluter is determined by what can be achieved under BACT.61 Thus,
61. E.g., S. REp. No. 127,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977) ("Considerable information
was received that the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, as presently
promulgated, failed to provide the protection required by law."); Implementation 1975,
supra note 43, at 23-24.
62. While the EPA regulations defined BACT as meeting the new source performance
standards, 40 C.F.R. § 52.01(0 (1976), the new statute defines BACT as "an emission
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction. . . which the permitting authori-
ty, on a case-by-case basis,. . . determine is achievable. ... Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127,91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified at42 U.S.C. §
7479(3)).
Senator Muskie said: "Such an approach should provide greater emission reductions
and allow more rapid application of improved technology than would otherwise occur
through the uniform application of the new source performance standards periodically
promulgated-and seldom changed-by the Environmental Protection Agency." 123
CONG. REC. 59265 (daily ed. June 9, 1977).
63. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7473).
64. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479). See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1975) ("Thus, each State is free to-and encouraged to-examine and impose
requirements for the use of the latest technological developments as a requirement in
granting the permit. This approach should lead to rapid adoption of improvements in
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one new major polluter cannot come into a clean air area and consume
the entire increment by refusing to use the best available emission
controls.
The question arises whether the ambient increments established in
the Amendments will be at the right level to force new technological
development. Clearly, the increments must be low enough to provide a
need and an incentive for better technology, yet not so low as to
discourage any new industry whatsoever. The statutory increments for
Class I and Class II are very similar to those provided under the earlier
EPA regulations.65 As to Class III, there is a basic difference in
approach between the EPA regulations and the statute. The regulations
provided no increment, only an absolute ceiling of the applicable
secondary standard.6 The statute retains the ceiling, but adds an
increment limitation of half the amount allowed in each secondary
standard.67 If the increment plus the baseline level of pollution
technology as new sources are built .. "); S. REP. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1976) ("The decision regarding the actual implementation of best available technology is
a key one, and the Committee places this responsibility with the State, to be determined
in a case-by-case judgment."). The approach was advocated by Robert Baum, Deputy
Assistant Administrator of General Enforcement, EPA, in a 1974 speech. Baum, Air
Quality Control in the 70's: Federal Viewpoint, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 189, 191 (1974)
(must combine technology approach with ambient approach).
65. Class I increments are:
Particulate Matter micrograms per cu. meter
Annual geometric mean 5
24-hr. maximum 10
Sulfur Dioxide
Annual arithmetic mean 2
24-hr. maximum 25
3-hr. maximum 25
The Class II increments are:
Particulate Matter micrograms per cu. meter
Annual geometric mean 19
24-hr. maximum 37
Sulfur Dioxide
Annual arithmetic mean 20
24-hr. maximum 91
3-hr. maximum 512
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(1), (2)).
66. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(2)(ii) (1976).
67. The Class III increments are:
Particulate Matter micrograms per cu. meter
Annual geometric mean 37
24-hr. maximum 75
Sulfur Dioxide
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achieves the lower total ambient level, the 50% increment applies. If,
however, this amount would exceed the statutory ceiling, then as much
of the increment as would exceed the ceiling level is disallowed.
68
Thus, the allowable increase for Class III under the statute may be the
same or less than under the regulations, but it will never be greater.
The result depends on the level of existing pollutants in the particular
area.
The effect of allowable increments in each Class on technological
development is reasonably clear. Class I increments are so low as to
allow no growth as a practical matter, and therefore no incentive for
technological development. 69 Class II increments are at an appropriate
level for limited growth. The increments are not too low because
experience under EPA regulations reveals controlled growth is possi-
ble. 70 They are not too high since industry desirous of taking advantage
of economies of scale by building increasingly larger plants will be
forced to find better technology.
7
'
Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(3)). The ambient air standards are:
Particulate Matter Primary Secondary
Annual geometric mean 75 60
24-hr. maximum 260 150
Sulfur Dioxide
Annual arithmetic mean 80
24-hr. maximum 365
3-hr. maximum 1300
40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-.7 (1976).
68. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7473(b)(3) and (4)).
69. The purpose of Class I must be kept in mind. It is intended to preserve the pristine
air quality of parks, forests, wildernesses and similar areas. No growth is desirable in
these areas for reasons other than technology-forcing. During debate on the House bill,
Congressman Rogers said:
Do the members know how many areas in the Nation are covered by class I
which we have asked to be kept clear and pure for the people of this country?
Only 125. The figure is only 125 ...
The class II areas and the class III areas are where the plants are to be built...
and we ought to keep the 125 areas to which I referred clean and pure.
123 CONG. REC. H5050 (daily ed. May 25, 1977).
70. "A nondegradation policy has been governing the country for the past two and
one-half years. . . .Growth did not stop. Industry did not come to a standstill. The
nation did not come to its knees. In fact, business has gone forward, and new facilities
were constructed." 123 CONG. REc. S9266 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Muskie). The Senator went on to give examples, which were "merely a sampling of the
hundreds of facilities that have been approved throughout the country." Id.
71. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 856 (Class II increments "will encourage
industry to make the big jump into the uncharted waters of utilizing best possible control
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Class III, however, is ineffective at forcing technological advance-
ment. The Senate version of the Act contained no Class 111.72 Its
inclusion was a compromise in conference because of problems pecul-
iar to high terrain areas.73 Even if it is conceded, however, that there
must be more flexibility for mountainous regions, Class III seems an
inappropriate means to achieve this flexibility. 74 For this leaves non-
mountainous areas without the special problems peculiar to high ter-
rain areas free to adopt a classification necessary in only a few places.
It does not provide technological incentive nor does it prevent signifi-
cant deterioration in that a relatively high level of pollution is allowed
in Class III areas.
technology."), 858 (Class II may preclude large industries who have not developed
adequate control technology).
72. See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1977); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 11,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1977); 123 CONG. REc. H8549 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1977).
73. An example is Utah, where the land is almost entirely mountains and valleys.
When a power plant is built in a valley, the plume hits the mountains rather than
dissipating in the air. In addition, this type of terrain causes temperature inversions
where cold air sits on top and, like a blanket, holds down the warm air and all the
pollutants. 123 CONG. REc. S9246, S9248 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Garn).
A large part of the controversy over high terrain was caused by the plans for an
Intermountain Power Project to be situated in Utah close to the California border. It
would have a capacity of 3,000 megawatts and would serve 23 cities in Utah and Los
Angeles, Anaheim, Riverside, Burbank, Pasadena and Glendale, California: a total of 3.7
million people. It would increase tax revenues by $30 to $40 million. 123 CONG. REC.
H5050-51 (daily ed. May 25, 1977). The project is planned for a site very near Capital
Reef National Park, a mandatory Class I area. During approximately 13 days of the year,
air inversions might cause winds to blow from the plant to the national park. Id. In the
House, an amendment passed which would have allowed variances in Class I and Class
II areas on 18 days of the year. The variances would have to be approved by the
Governor of the State and would allow an increase to Class II and Class III levels,
respectively. 123 CONG. REC. H5047, H5051 (daily ed. May 25, 1977). A similar amend-
ment was defeated in the Senate. 123 CONG. REc. S9245, S9279 (daily ed. June 9, 1977).
The conference committee agreed on a Class I variance, with the limitation that a
variance can be disapproved by the federal land manager. In that case, only the President
can reinstate the variance if he finds it in the national interest. The variance is limited to
18 days. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685
(1977) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(D)).
74. It was repeatedly stated that the Intermountain Power Project group testified
before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce that it could build its plant on a site east of the park,
very near the original site, without the need for a variance. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC.
H5038, H5050 (daily ed. May 25, 1977), S9247 (daily ed. June 9, 1977). It is important that
in the Class I variance finally adopted (see note 73 supra) both the federal land manager
and the President have the power to veto a variance. The President, EPA, and the
Secretary of the Interior (the federal land manager) all came out against the variance and
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B. Regulation of All Pollutants
In Sierra Club v. EPA, the Sierra Club challenged EPA's failure to
regulate all pollutants for which national ambient air standards had
been promulgated. 75 The Sierra Club argued for BACT for all pollut-
ants while the EPA regulations required BACT only for sulfur dioxide
and particulates.76
The rationale for not including carbon monoxide, photo-chemical
oxidants, hydrocarbons and nitrogen dioxide in significant deteriora-
tion control was that the relationship between emissions and ambient
air levels of these pollutants was not understood. Accurate meas-
urements of these pollutants in the ambient air are not possible at
levels substantially below the national standards.' This may be a
logical reason not to establish allowable ambient air increments for
these pollutants, but it is not a good reason not to regulate them at all.
Congress recognized this in the Clean Air Amendments and required
"the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to
regulation under this Act." 78 But BACT is only the first step.
The Administrator is required to develop, within two years, regulations
to prevent significant deterioration resulting from these pollutants. If
other national ambient standards are promulgated, nondegradation
regulations must issue within two years. Finally, the states may devel-
op their own plan to prevent nondegradation caused by pollutants
other than sulfur dioxide and particulates. The only limitation is that
the plan be at least as effective as the statutory area classification
plan.79
This provision is desirable for states that want to move quickly
against significant deterioration. Additionally, it provides the same
flexibility and freedom to experiment explicitly granted in section 107
for plans to achieve the national standards.8° States are required by
75. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
76. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(d)(2)(ii) (1976).
77. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Sierra Club
replied that as much as one-half of these pollutants come from sources other than
automobiles, sources which could be subjected to BACT. BACT could be applied even
though ambient levels of these pollutants can't be easily measured. Implementation 1975,
supra note 43, at 966-71. EPA admitted that emissions could be minimized. Sierra Club
v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
78. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)) (emphasis added).
79. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7476).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (1970).
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that section to promulgate plans to achieve a certain level of pollution
control but the method is for the most part up to them. 81 Flexibility is
an inherent and often recognized benefit of a federal system. The
states should know what means of pollution control will work best,
taking into account any unique local conditions.
C. Regulation of All Major Sources
Sierra Club also raised a related problem of what sources must
undergo new source review. 82 The EPA regulations established a list of
major sources subject to review if located in a Class I or Class II area.83
The regulations omitted major sources of unregulated pollutants and
also sources of sulfur dioxide and particulates. 84 EPA's rationale for
requiring review of only the nineteen listed sources was to avoid
review for new homes and similar small polluters. The Sierra Club,
however, argued for review for any new source expected to emit more
than 1000 tons per year of any of the regulated pollutants. 85
The congressional solution addresses both concerns. It required
review (1) of any new source appearing on a list of twenty-nine sources
with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of any pollutant, and (2)
review of any new source with the potential to emit 250 tons or more
per year. 86 The broader statutory coverage provides a method to elimi-
nate the minor polluter without letting major sources escape regula-
tion.87 In addition, the statutory plan has the advantage of automatic
and immediate regulation of any new industrial processes which might
be developed in the future.88 The plan also preserves equity by subject-
ing all polluters of the same magnitude to new source review and
BACT. A limited exemption for nonprofit health and educational in-
stitutions89 does not disturb this equitable balance since health and
81. Id. The section is quoted in relevant part at note 46 supra.
82. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
83. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(d)(1) (1976).
84. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 972.
85. Id.
86. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1)).
87. 123 CONG. REC. S9169 (daily ed. June 8, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (major
emitting facilities don't include houses, dairies, farms, highways, hospitals, schools,
grocery stores or similar sources).
88. Sierra Club mentioned this advantage when it proposed the definition of major
sources in its comments on EPA's proposed final regulations. Implementation 1975,
supra note 43, at 973.
89. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1)). The last sentence of the section said: "This term
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educational sources are unlikely to pollute to the same degree as an
industrial source.
D. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Sierra Club challenged the EPA regulations because prior to any
redesignation of an area a cost-benefit analysis was required to be
performed by the state. The analysis was to include growth anticipated
in the area, as well as the social, environmental and economic effects
of the redesignation. 90 The Sierra Club argued that such a cost-benefit
analysis would allow significant deterioration of air quality. According
to their argument, economic and social factors should not enter into
the decision of how much deterioration is significant. Sierra Club also
pointed out that the Administrator's authority to disapprove a redesig-
nation if social and economic factors were not considered might thwart
a Class I designation which was based solely on air quality concerns.
91
The legislative solution was not responsive to this argument. The
statute provides that:
Prior to redesignation of any area . . . a satisfactory descrip-
tion and analysis of health, environmental, economic, social and
energy effects of the proposed redesignation shall be prepared
The Administrator can disapprove a redesignation only if the procedur-
al requirements are not met, but cost-benefit analysis is one of these
procedural requirements. 93
The effect of this statutory provision is to shift the basic policy
decision of whether there is sufficient justification to allow deteriora-
[major emitting facility] shall not include new or modified facilities which are nonprofit
health or education institutions which have been exempted by the State." Id.
90. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(3)(ii)(D) (1976).
91. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 960 n.5.
92. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b)(1)(A)).
93. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b)). The redesignation must be specifically approved
by the Governor after consultation with the legislature and appropriate local govern-
ment. There must be notice and public hearings in any area affected, preceded by
analysis of the health, environmental, economic, social and energy effects of the pro-
posed redesignation. The public must have access to any specific plans for new or
modified sources which may receive permits only if the area is redesignated Class III.
The appropriate federal agency must have opportunity to make comments and recom-
mendations if federal lands are involved. Id.
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tion to the states. Of course, all decisions to permit deterioration are
subject to both incremental and absolute limits, even for Class III. 94
This approach is consistent with the dominant theme of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, which is to provide a wide latitude for state
control over decision-making. 95 Yet one must wonder whether the wide
discretion granted to the states is advantageous where the prospects
exist for limiting the policy against nondegradation. The question of
control over the program is considered in the following section.
E. Federalism: Who Controls?
The division of power between state and national governments is a
persistent problem in our federal democracy, and it became important
again in the context of nondegradation. In Sierra Club v. EPA, both
the state and industrial intervening petitioners challenged the EPA
regulations on the grounds that too little rather than too much control
was delegated to the states. 96 Industry argued that nondeterioration
imposed a land use policy based on air quality criteria. Relying on the
tenth amendment, 97 industry argued that the authority to control land
use is not given to the federal government, and therefore it must be
reserved to the states. 98
The reserve power argument has been tried in many contexts. The
problem with the argument is that power expressly granted to Congress
is not reserved at all99 and Congress clearly has the power under the
commerce clause to legislate against air pollution. 10 Furthermore, air
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(3) and (4)). The ceiling is the lowest applicable
national standard. Id. The Class III increments are listed in note 67 supra.
95. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1977) ("the committee
expects that State and Local governments will take advantage of the renewed opportuni-
ty proposed by these amendments to adopt the necessary review mechanisms so as to
eliminate even the suggestion of a Federal presence in this area."); 123 CONG. REC.
S13697 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) ("These amendments tell the
American people that Congress got the message; that the National Government realizes
that change without an adequate underpinning cannot be forced; that local decisions
locally arrived at with proper incentives, can achieve the goals we share.").
96. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1138-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
97. Id. at 1140. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
98. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
99. The tenth amendments says: "The powers not delegated . .. are reserved."
U.S. CONsT. amend. X (emphasis added).
100. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court cited
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("None of the
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pollution is a nationwide problem which does not respect artificial state
boundaries. Pollutants discharged into the air have been shown to
travel as much as 2000 miles.' 0' In the context of nondegradation
legislation, even small amounts of pollution carried to highly polluted
eastern cities would be detrimental to the effort to achieve the national
standards.10 2 Most important, air pollution adversely affects commerce
in the damage it causes to health, agriculture and property.1
0 3
Commerce is also adversely affected by the potential "Balkaniza-
tion" of states.1 4 If a state adopts a strict nondeterioration policy and
its neighbor does not, it could potentially lose both in an economic
sense and in the quality of its air."15 Industry will move out or fail to
enter the state causing a loss in tax dollars and jobs. As industry settles
in the neighboring state, the pollution will not remain where it origi-
petitioners challenge the congressional determination that air pollution has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce and therefore may be regulated by the federal government
under the commerce clause."); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir.
1974) (The commerce clause says "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes"); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 1974) ("The Commonwealth
does not dispute that air pollution has an effect on commerce and hence can be validly
regulated by Congress."); U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8.
101. Mr. Richard Lahn, Washington Representative of Sierra Club, testifying before
the Subcommittee on Public Works in 1975, said:
One well-documented episode in May, 1972 traced the transport of pollutants
from the industrialized Ohio Valley to the Miami, Florida area where it caused a 50-
percent rise in sulfates, lowered visibility to 6 miles, caused smoke and haze for 5
days and produced a 20-percent increase in respiratory disorders. This was directly
attributed to the pollutants originating over 2,000 miles away.
Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 851; 123 CONG. REC. 59170 (daily ed. June 8,
1977) (remarks Sen. Muskie).
102. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 851.
103. One study suggests that a doubling of 1973 pollution levels on the east coast
would cause a 25-100% loss of certain crops. Id. Acid rain damages crops and soil and
pollutes streams. For a critical analysis of the basis of sulfur oxide standards and their
health effects at low doses, see the Tabershaw/Cooper Report. Id. at 391-402.
104. The term "Balkanizing" was first used in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390,
400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring), in reference to petty, local restrictions on interstate
commerce. "Balkanization" has appeared in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 97 S.
Ct. 1740, 1752 (1977) ("proliferation of residency requirements for commercial fisher-
men would create precisely the sort of Balkanization of interstate commercial activity
which the Constitution was intended to prevent."); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 8
(1959) (privilege of ingress and egress among the states was to prevent the walling off of
states, "what has been called the Balkanization of the Nation."); and H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,554 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (Balkanization of
trade is "trade barriers so high between the states that the stream of interstate commerce
cannot flow over them.").
105. Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 6, 50.
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nates. "[S]ince air pollution does not respect State boundaries, the air
quality of the State with the prohibition against significant deteriora-
tion may still decline because of the pollution coming from its more
lenient neighbor." 1 6
The federal government also has a duty to preserve federal lands.
Most of these are primitive areas of unusual natural splendor where
aesthetic values are dominant. 10 7 As one representative said,
"[S]mogging of the pristine areas in the West means that the American
people are being robbed of being able to enjoy one of our most
cherished pursuits: simple communion with the land which is the
source of so much of our Nation's bounty."108 The states would like to
retain control over these lands,' °9 but it must be recognized that nation-
al parks and wildernesses are for all the people of the United States
and not just the citizens of one state. Thus, responsibility to protect
federal lands surely rests on the federal government.
Though Congress has the power to retain primary control over
nondegradation, the 1977 legislation gives maximum control to the
states consistent with the federal responsibility to protect both national
and local interests. "0 Except for Indian lands,111 and large national and
106. Id. Sixteen states participated in an amici curiae brief for respondents Sierra
Club before the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S.
541 (1973). Their brief is reprinted in Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 993, 997
("The requirement of no significant deterioration removes the possibility of economic
coercion between competing regions based on the stringency of emission control require-
ments.").
107. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. S9266 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Muskie) ("The Federal Land Manager has a mandate to protect the air quality values of
these areas."); Id. at S9268 (letter from Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the Interior) ("I am
charged to protect the natural, scenic and primitive values of national parks and wilder-
ness areas."); S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977) ("[The Federal land
manager should assume an aggressive role in protecting the air quality values of land
areas under his jurisdiction.").
108. 123 CONG. REC. H8669 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Waxman).
109. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
110. 123 CoNG. REC. S9169 (daily ed. June 8, 1977) (Senate bill placed primary
responsibility and authority with the states); Id. at S9172 ("The States are assigned the
lead role in implementing nondegradation policy."); Id. at S9172 (statement of Sen.
Muskie) ("The States are assigned the lead role in implementing nondegradation poli-
cy. "); see also id. at S9245 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Garn) ("Congress
has never been bashful about usurping State responsibilities, and can do so in a clear and
unequivocal manner, when it wants to.").
11l. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7474). Subsection (c) says "Lands within the exterior
boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated
only by the appropriate Indian governing body." Id.
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international parks and wilderness areas which are mandatory Class
1,112 the states' power to redesignate is almost total.13 The federal land
manager can make recommendations about redesignation of other
federal land, 114 but the recommendations are not binding on the
states." 5 Similarly, the statute does not enforce a federal land use plan.
Nondegradation is not the only factor, nor in many cases even the
major factor in land use decision-making. Such diverse considerations
as water quality, sewer hook-ups and mass transportation might be
determinative factors in an industry's decision on where to locate."
6
Moreover, since Class II allows reasonable growth, "air quality con-
trols do not dictate most land use decisions but simply require the use
of proper pollution control equipment.""17 Land use decisions should
be made at the state and local level to provide flexibility to consider
peculiar local problems within a comprehensive plan. This seems ex-
actly what the Clean Air Amendments of 1977 achieve.
The legislative scheme strikes a fair balance of power between the
states and the federal government. The federal government retains
some control over federal lands to ensure their preservation for all the
people." 8 To allow state control over Indian lands, for example, might
raise difficult questions of sovereignty that are better left alone. The
uniform requirement of BACT is an advantage to the states. Uni-
formity tends to deter economic competition on the basis of air quali-
ty."19 Industry that must apply the same control anywhere it locates has
little air quality basis to choose one state over another. However the
desire to eliminate economic competition on the basis of air quality is
seriously weakened by the inclusion of Class III along with the require-
ment that states consider economic and social factors in redesignation.
112. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127,91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7472(a)).
113. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127,91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7474).
114. Id.
115. Id. The section says:
In redesignating any area under this section with respect to which any Federal
land manager has submitted written comments and recommendations, the State
shall publish a list of any inconsistency between such redesignation and such
recommendation and an explanation of such inconsistency (together with the rea-
sons for making such redesignation against the recommendation of the Federal land
manager).
116. See Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 963-65.
117. Id. at 965.
118. See note 107 supra.
119. See notes 104-07 supra.
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Allowing a state to redesignate an area Class III has the potential of
undermining the whole plan for nondegradation. It allows deterioration
to the national standards in some cases. 120 It also may effectively
eliminate technology forcing. 12' An industry anxious to build a large
plant will be more likely to choose a Class III location than to develop
new controls efficient enough to meet Class II limits. 22 The mere
threat of loss of this industry might deter states from remaining entire-
ly Class I and Class II.
Required consideration of economic and social factors further aggra-
vates the problem. Economic and social factors include jobs, tax
revenue, new energy sources and exploitation of natural resources. If
the choice was between Class I and Class II only, there would be no
problem. The choice between almost no growth and normal controlled
growth must necessarily include these factors. But the possibility of
Class III adds a third choice: greater and faster expansion. The allow-
ance for greater industrial expansion, in one sense, is contrary to the
recognized need to maintain our environment and conserve energy.
With this necessity to alter our lifestyles, the inclusion of Class III is an
invitation to delay difficult changes.123 It is unlikely that Congress will
amend the statute again soon. Therefore the only realistic hope is that
states and their citizens will use their decision-making power wisely. 24
III. INTO THE FUTURE:
The future prospects for successful implementation of nondegrada-
tion policy rest with the states. Congress has provided a tool, but
without citizen support even the best possible legislation against pollu-
tion cannot be effective.
The crucial component of both health-based and technology-
based standards is the implicit or explicit delineation of the accept-
120. See note 67 supra.
121. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
122. See note 71 supra.
123. Cubia Clayton, Chief of the Air Quality Division of the New Mexico EPA said:
In New Mexico, there are abundant coal resources as there are generally through-
out the Rocky Mountain West. These resources. . . are surely going to be devel-
oped. The temptation is, however, to develop quickly, first come first served and
damn the environmental consequences. NSD, properly administered, should act to
insure that states adequately consider the desirability of each industry on an
individual basis, weighing all the factors involved.
Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 859. Proper administration of no significant
deterioration, to Mr. Clayton, does not include the possibility of Class III. Id.
124. Senator Muskie said "It is my hope that States will use the Class III approach
with great care." 123 CONG. REc. S13701 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
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able costs of pollution reduction. . . .In the absence of any firm
political resolve that the benefits of pollution abatement outweigh
social and economic disruption, the capacity of both types of
standards to force technological changes will be sharply limited.125
There is often wide disagreement about what costs and benefits are,
let alone what balance should be struck between them. 126 For example,
one of the major costs of nondegradation is the cost to industry to
decrease pollution. Such costs may result from development of new
equipment and/or processes, production, installation, maintenance and
operation of equipment. The difficulty in measuring costs and benefits
plus striking a balance between them is illustrated through an examina-
tion of the impact the new legislation will have on utilities.
The major impact of the nondeterioration legislation will probably be
on electric utilities because of the relatively high sulfur content of the
coal used in most generating plants. 2 7 As expected, the industry's own
cost estimate is higher than the EPA's. A report commissioned by the
Electric Utility Industry Clean Air Coordinating Committee estimated
an additional capital cost of 18-30% to comply with the Clean Air
Act. 1 The technology is available in the form of flue-gas desulfuriza-
tion systems, more commonly known as "scrubbers."' 2 9 But the indus-
try report claims scrubbers will use between 160,597 and 373,763
megawatts of power by 1990.130 EPA disagreed with these industry
projections and claimed that industry capital expenditures will be
increased by only 3%. 131
It is unlikely that industry will absorb these costs. Rather they will
probably be passed on to the consumers. Thus, a more accurate cost
increase is the one reflected in household utility bills: 2% by 1990
125. La Pierre, supra note 57, at 838.
126. For an analysis of problems in cost/benefit determinations for air pollution
control, see Kramer, supra note 13, at 164-68. See Implementation 1975, supra note 43,
at 31 ("While many witnesses call for benefit-cost analysis, little information was
offered for improving these types of studies.").
127. 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2172 (1976).
128. 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1382 (1975). The variation depends on the interpretation of
best available control technology: new source performance standards or scrubbers plus
low-sulfur coal. Id.
129. See Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 88-90. But see S. REP. No. 717,94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 119 (1976) (Sen. McClure suggests scrubbers may pose an environ-
mental hazard and that there is a controversy as to their value).
130. 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1383 (1975).
131. 6 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 2172 (1976). The Federal Energy Administration predicts
additional capital cost of 2.5 to 2.7% and additional operating cost of 1.1% by 1990. 6
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1583 (1976).
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according to EPA,'3 2 and 11-15% according to industry studies.133 To
put those figures in perspective, the Chairman of New Mexico Citizens
for Clean Air and Water, Inc. estimated that a 7% increase in the cost
of delivered power would mean an increase of about $1.00 a month on
the average utility bill.' 34 Adding the indirect increased cost of manu-
factured goods, the increased cost would result in about a $4.00 a
month increase. 13 5 Other estimates are even lower. 136 This revenue,
however, does not buy only pollution abatement. "[I]t creates new
jobs in research, design, construction and plant operation in the new
pollution control industry. It also begins in a small way to encourage
the wise use of energy, which all sectors publicly agree is a national
goal."1 3
7
Another cost associated with nondegradation policies is the adverse
impact on energy development.138 Coal is the major concern, particu-
larly in relation to the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination
Act of 1974.139 That Act was designed to increase the use of coal by
utilities and industry. 14 Since coal is more abundant than oil and
natural gas, its increased use will decrease dependence on foreign
energy and conserve domestic oil and natural gas. 141 But coal is also a
higher polluting fuel when compared with oil and gas. Consequently,
132. 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2172 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 134-49 (1976).
133. 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2178 (1976).
134. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 922-23.
135. Id.
136. 123 CONG. REC. S9171 (daily ed. June 8, 1977) (EPA study showed 2.3% increase
per month).
137. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 923.
138. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. S8074 (daily ed. May 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Garn)
(". . . [I]t is impossible to reconcile the stated goal of coal conversion with the stated
position of the administration on clean air."); 123 CONG. REC. S9248 (daily ed. June 9,
1977) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (development of coal gasification and oil shale would be
frustrated); 123 CONG. REC. S9260 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Johnston);
123 CONG. REC. S9300 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) ("There are
those who say increased coal use is incompatible with Clean Air Act requirements, and
push for relaxation.").
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-798 (Supp. V 1975).
140. Id. One provision in the Clean Air Act Amendments exempts from the total
allowable ambient air increase concentrations due to coal conversions under the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974. Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7473(c)(1)(A)).
141. 123 CONG. REC. S9300 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
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some argue that we cannot have both greater coal use and a nondegra-
dation policy. 142 This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First,
conservation measures, according to EPA, will decrease emissions
from oil and gas, 143 thus offsetting increased coal emissions. Addition-
ally, the BACT requirement insures that coal will be burned as cleanly
as possible. 144 EPA has estimated that 6000 megawatt power plants,
two times as large as the largest existing plant, can be built in Class II
areas if BACT is used. 145 Thus, the nondegradation plan actually al-
lows for more use of coal with less pollution.146
Somewhat different kinds of costs concerned the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in a comment on EPA's origi-
nal four nondeterioration proposals. 47 HEW found probable "negative
impacts on economic growth, urban development capabilities, energy
resource development, consumer prices, the status of low-income
persons, and the public health."' 148 Basically HEW's argument is that
nondeterioration will prevent growth, not only in clean areas, but also
in polluted urban areas. The industries which lack the incentive to
move to clean areas will remain in the cities, thus reducing the im-
provement in city air and the chance for new growth in industry. 149
Additionally, HEW was concerned with the adverse health effects
on large urban populations. On the assumption that improvement in air
quality in highly populated areas will be slowed because industry lacks
incentive to leave, HEW says nondeterioration will have more of an
adverse health effect on a greater number of people than it will have a
beneficial effect. 150 The possible benefits of nondegradation will be
unavailable to the urban poor, who have no means to travel to clean air
areas far from their homes in the cities. 15
There are a number of responses to these arguments. First, the
application of BACT should eliminate, or at least strictly limit the
142. See note 138 supra.
143. 123 CONG. REC. S9300 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
144. Id.
145. 123 CONG. REC. H8667 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Broyhill).
146. Id.
147. Reprinted in Clean Air Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on En-
vironmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 872-95
(1974).
148. Id. at 874.
149. Id. at 875, 879-81.
150. Id. at 874, 889-90.
151. Id. at 874-75, 878.
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effect of pollution control on industry location decisions.)52 If the
technology forcing aspects of nondegradation work, new control de-
velopments can be applied in urban areas as well. 153 Reduced pollution
would allow industry expansion under another section in the Clean Air
Amendments of 1977.154 That section provides emission offsets when
pollution is reduced in an area where national standards have not been
attained.155 Finally, HEW's position is inconsistent. If industry stays in
the cities, the health of people will be affected. Yet if industry leaves,
there will be a decrease in jobs. It's arguable that the urban poor would
prefer to have jobs in that the effects of poverty are more immediate
than the effects of air pollution.
The thrust of HEW's argument is to advocate a large-scale disper-
sion technique whereby pollution is spread. The country's skies would
be uniformly gray. 56 The problem with this approach is that nondegra-
dation policy is thwarted in that pollution is merely spread, not con-
trolled.
The health benefits acquired through nondegradation are also sub-
ject to controversy. Some argue that the national ambient standards
are sufficient to protect against any adverse health effects of air
pollution. 157 But there is an assumption basic to the whole concept of
national standards which is probably not true: that there is some
precise threshold below which there are no adverse health effects. 5
The supposed threshold is merely a reflection of current scientific
knowledge. 59 In some cases, the scientific basis is no longer even
current. For example, the standards for sulfur dioxide were estab-
lished more than three years ago. 60 Since then, the National Academy
152. See notes 104-107 supra.
153. Implementation 1975, supra note 43, at 875.
154. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127,91 Stat. 685(1977)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7479).
155. Id.
156. "The EPA frankly told the Supreme Court [in Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541
(1973)] that its policy was to move major pollution sources from cities to rural areas with
clean air. This is a policy of spreading evenly air pollution across the country rather than
controlling it at its source." Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 6.
157. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 503-04 (1976).
158. H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-91 (1976); Nondegradation Policy,
supra note 6, at 8-9, 53-58.
159. H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1976) ("... the threshold concept
is not a very helpful one because it is a level that changes with time, i.e., as measurement
methods for either the pollutants or the biological indicator improve, the threshold will
shift."); Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 8.
160. 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1976).
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of Science has said that there is a "possibility that ambient sulfur
dioxides are a factor in the production of human lung cancer. ' 16
Respiratory cancer has been increasing by 4.5% annually at the same
time discovery and treatment methods have been improving.162 Yet
there is no evidence of a threshold level and little likelihood that
adequate dose-response data can soon be established. 63 Similar prob-
lems exist for other pollutants.164 The chronic effects of long term low-
level exposure to pollution is particularly insidious because it is dif-
ficult for both the scientists and the public to understand the cause/ef-
fect relationship.165 The synergistic effect of low level pollutants in
combination may present even further hazards. 66
Nondeterioration also provides agricultural benefits. Sulfur dioxide
levels below the national standards cause leaf damage, growth inhibi-
tion and increased plant mortality.167 Plant damage from sulfur dioxide
in synergistic combination with ozone occurs at a level thirty times,
lower than the national primary standard."6 Sulfur and nitrogen ox-
ides, even at low levels, cause "acid rain" which leaches out necessary
plant nutrients in the soil. 69
The aesthetic benefits of increased visibility are undisputed. In-
creased air pollution means decreased visibility even below the sec-
ondary standards.1 70 At the secondary level it would be impossible to
see across the Grand Canyon. As the President of the Sierra Club said:
It is easy to dismiss visibility as unimportant, as merely a luxury
which can be readily sacrificed. However, the difference between
crystal clear air and the haze of our cities makes a dramatic impact
on the quality of life. Already the haze over the Rocky Mountains
and the Southwest can be readily seen. Soon, when we want to
escape the perpetual haze of our cities, there will be no place togo. 17-1
161. H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1976).
162. Id. at 92.
163. Id. at 95-96.
164. Id. at 90-93.
165. Id. at 95-97.
166. Id. at 98-101.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 108.
169. Id. at 108-111; Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 8-9, 56-57.
170. Nondegradation Policy, supra note 6, at 9.
171. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
How then, should the balance between costs and benefits be struck?
It must be remembered that what is at stake is an irreplaceable re-
source about which all the effects of changes are not known. It is
therefore "wise to err on the side of preservation. 1' 72 With this in
mind, nonsignificant deterioration becomes a necessary policy. The
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments' "preventive" approach to pollution
abatement 73 is a good beginning. What is now needed is education to
foster an awareness in people that change is absolutely necessary if we
are to survive. How much better it will be if we realize the conse-
quences before we allow our skies to become uniformly gray.
172. Hines, supra note 10, at 652.
173. 123 CONG. REc. H8663 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
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